There is a trend to move more and more information processing towards
the edges of information systems, close to the data sources and sinks,
and to the end-users . In 2018, Gartner evaluated that 10% of
“enterprise-generated data is created and processed outside a
traditional centralized data center or cloud” , and predicted in
2021 that this number would increase to 50% in 2025  (which it
originally predicted at 75% in its 2018 report ) while the number
of IoT devices will triple  or quadruple  between 2020 and
2030 reaching “more than 15 billion IoT devices [that] will connect to
the enterprise infrastructure by 2029”  (IoT analytics even
forecasts 27 billions connected IoT devices by 2025 ). There are
varying reasons for this trend, among which: improving latency,
relieving the network bandwidth from part of the huge amount of data
generated, and bringing some autonomy to the end-users interacting at
the periphery of the information system. This trend exists in the civil
world, and in particular in industry with the specific concept of
Industrial IoT (IIoT)    , but also in the
military one with the concepts of the Internet of Battle Things (IoBT)
   or Internet of Military Things (IoMT)  ,
which aim in part to increase local information exploitation 
 . To develop those concepts in the military domain, among
other initiatives, the Internet of Battlefield Things Collaborative
Research Alliance (IoBT-CRA)    was established in 2017
for a 10 years period.
In this call, devices handling those peripheral computations are called
Smart Peripheral Devices (SPDs). Those SPDs are quiet different
from, and have more variability, than devices found in the “core” of
information systems (servers, desktops and laptops). They range: from
somewhat expensive and powerful devices, such as smartphones or
communication equipment of military vehicles ; to low cost low
power devices, such as disposable wearable devices or disposable
vessels  ; through Internet of Things (IoT) devices
, and some lightweight Edge Computing devices . While
quite different, SPDs share some characteristics: they reside at the
periphery of the system and are more susceptible to loss and theft; they
have to comply with specific constraints limiting the resources they can
use; they run on specific hardware usually not found in “core” devices;
they use connection technologies not found in the core of the system to
communicate with the core and between themselves; they handle some
information processing directly, independently from the core of the
system; they have to allow for “temporary” disconnections from the core,
while still being able to function properly; and they are not
continuously visible and monitored by the core of the information
Those specifics raise some concerns over their resilience to
cybersecurity attacks       
    , and even the faithfulness of their
supply chain . As stated by Verizon for IoT , but applying
to all SPD, “an [SPD] can be an attack vector (a weak point that can
be exploited to mount an attack), a vehicle for attacks (like a part of
a botnet used to carry out a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS)
attack) or a target in its own right”. For example, the Mirai botnet
 infected many IoT devices and has been used to attack many other
systems. Mobiles are also an interesting target for attackers 
  . Over a one year period, half of companies recently
surveyed by Verizon suffered a compromise involving a mobile device
; for half of the companies concerned, applications were involved
(in 2021, the percentage of organizations experiencing the installation
of a malware on a remote device doubled ); and half of SMBs that
suffered a mobile-related hack said that it had a major impact.
Attackers do design applications and phishing campaigns specifically for
mobiles , and if they do its because there is a benefit in doing
so. As a consequence, more than 8 companies out of 10 have a specific
budget for mobile security . Last year C&ESAR addressed the
concept of Zero Trust, among others. From the point of view of the
security of the core of the information system, an SPD can be
disconnected if the core has lost trust in it. However, the features
carried by this SPD will also be lost. It is therefore important to be
able to secure those SPDs.
However, cybersecurity technologies and methodologies applied to the
core of information systems are not necessarily directly applicable to
SPDs. Adapting standard Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions
to the vast variety of SPD and integrating them to the core IT system
SIEM is not a simple task. The specific technologies used for SPDs may
contain weaknesses and vulnerabilities different from those of core
system technologies  . Ensuring the cybersecurity of SPDs
may also require specific methodologies .
For example, SPDs use specific technologies in their processing stack
(hardware and software). Among the various hardware used, they rely more
commonly on ARM platforms and technologies. Those hardwares and
deployment environment have specific characteristics impacting their
cybersecurity  . Among the various hardware support for
securing SPDs , we can cite Secure Elements (SE)  or Tusted
Execution Element (TEE). SPDs also use specific operating systems, such
as Android and iOS for smartphones  . And, for some of them,
they allow end-users (hopefully the device administrator) to pull
computing payloads from application stores populated by softwares coming
from various, sometimes obscure, sources. The low confidence in the
cybersecurity level of those application stores has pushed some
institutions such as Google to launch initiatives to improve the state
of affairs  or to launch projects aiming at standardizing the
cybersecurity requirements for those applications  . This
state of affairs with regard to the low cybersecurity level of mobile
applications pushes for much need improvements .
SPDs also use different technologies to connect to the core of the
information system and to connect between themselves. One promising
technology is the 5G one     , and 6G in
the future  . However, this technology, as well as the
others, have raised cybersecurity concerns among researchers ,
institutions         and
industry  . For example, even the specification of Bluetooth
contains vulnerabilities   . The deployment
environment and ability of SPDs to create device-to-device connections
result in networks, such as ad hoc or mesh ones, having different shapes
and behaving differently than core information system networks, and
having specific cybersecurity concerns.
To secure communications in those networks, SPDs can rely on
cryptography. However, the low level of infrastructure support some of
them receive and low computation power some of them have may require
some specific cryptographic solutions, such as lightweight cryptography
 or specific key agreement protocols .
Another challenge that comes with SPDs is their deployment “far away”
from the core of the information system, and with an intermittent
connection to it. This setting prevents the implementation of security
policies centered around the core of the information system. SPDs
require sepcific security policies that require specific means for
deployment, management and enforcement. Those means need to be secured
in their own right in order to prevent attackers from exploiting them to
take control of the managed SPDs.
Finally, the peripheral deployment of SPDs, their proximity to
information sources, and their common reliance on information collection
imply concerns over privacy and data protection issues  
 . As a consequence, policymakers have published specific
and generic laws and regulations that apply to SPDs   
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C&ESAR solicits the following types of papers:
- Regular paper: 10 to 16 pages paper describing work not yet published;
- Short paper: 4 to 8 pages paper describing work not yet published;
- Extended abstract: 3 to 6 pages abstract of a large audience didactic paper recently published (by the same authors or a superset of them) in a peer-reviewed journal or conference proceedings (papers of interest include in particular: states of the art or practice; surveys; experience reports; and directly applicable solutions to common problems).
The regular paper type includes Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) papers that “evaluate, systematize, and contextualize existing knowledge” (https://www.jsys.org/type_SoK/). Examples of SoK papers can be found at https://oaklandsok.github.io/.
C&ESAR follows a 3 steps submission process (abstract, proposal, final version). Evaluation and selection is done on the proposal and final version steps. During the proposal step, a selective evaluation is done with a low selection rate on a detailed outline of the proposed article (or directly on the final version if a final version is submitted as proposal). During the final version step, an evaluation with a high selection rate is done on the final version of the accepted proposals.
- First step (abstract): title, authors and abstract of the proposals have to be registered no later than Wednesday, May 10, 2023 on EasyChair: https://easychair.org/conferences/?conf=cesar2023.
- Second step (proposal): proposals (3 to 16 pages for all types of papers) have to be submitted as a PDF file no later than Wednesday, May 17, 2023 via EasyChair. Authors will be notified of their proposal preselection by Wednesday, June 28, 2023 (a final selection will be made on the final version).
- Regular paper: If desired, authors can already submit a complete paper of up to 16 pages. However, reviewers will not be required to invest more efforts at this stage than they would for a 6 pages proposal.
- Short paper: If desired, authors can already submit a complete paper of up to 8 pages. However, reviewers will not be required to invest more efforts at this stage than they would for a 6 pages proposal.
- Extended abstract proposals must: be explicitly identified as such by the mention “(extended abstract)” in their title; explicitly identify and cite the original publication; and, contain an appendix containing the (anonymized) comments made by the reviewers of the original publication. If desired, at this stage, authors can submit the PDF of the original article instead of the PDF of a summary. However, reviewers will not be required to invest more efforts at this stage than they would for a 6 pages summary.
- Third step (final version): authors of preselected papers have to upload the final version of their paper on EasyChair by Wednesday, August 30, 2023. Authors of preselected papers commit to address reviewers’ comments in this final version. A final selection with a really high selection rate is performed at this stage.
Language and selection criteria
Papers are written in French or in English (English translations of title and abstract of papers written in French must be provided).
C&ESAR is aimed at the following audience of decision makers and practitioners:
- Decision makers interested in:
- broad and well constructed overview of a problematic and its solutions;
- “technology scouts” of operational units interested in:
- knowing more about the state of practice (what others in the same domain do),
- identifying recent mature technologies that may help solving some of their operational problems;
- Engineers and researchers of innovation units interested in:
- knowing more about the state of the art in their specialty,
- knowing more about the operational problems addressed by others in their community,
- identifying recent to be matured technologies that may help solving some of their operational problems;
- Engineers and researchers of research units interested in:
- knowing more about the state of the art in specialties related to their own,
- identifying operational problems related to their research specialties
For all types of papers, selection criteria include in particular: fitness for the audience; clarity; pedagogical (didactical) value; and respect of this call for papers topic and guidelines.
For regular papers and short papers, highly specialized technical papers will be appreciated if they contribute to explain and analyze the state of the art or practice and their deficiencies.
For extended abstracts, the original publication must be clearly identified and cited. Moreover, the selection process is more selective, and emphasizes the didactical quality and large audience of the papers.
Instructions for the format of proposals and papers
Proposals and papers must be submitted as PDF files, without page numbering, following the single column format of “CEUR Workshop Proceedings” in “emphasizing capitalized style” (http://ceur-ws.org/HOWTOSUBMIT.html#PREPARE).
Templates are available for LaTeX, docx (Word) and ODT (Word or LibreOffice) at the following URL: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-XXX/CEURART.zip.
A PDF example and a TeX template configured for C&ESAR 2023 are available on Overleaf at https://www.overleaf.com/read/pybqxvxhzpwj (it must be duplicated before edition). Submissions not looking like this example will not be considered for inclusion in the official proceedings.
Authors can opt out of inclusion in any form of proceedings.
As far as possible (and since 2021), the official conference proceedings are submitted for publication to “CEUR Workshop Proceedings” (http://ceur-ws.org), and efforts are performed in order to facilitate indexing of articles in Google Scholar.
This publication is conditioned by the respect of this publisher’s constraints (http://ceur-ws.org/HOWTOSUBMIT.html) and acceptance criteria, in particular respect of its paper format and having a majority of high quality articles written in English.
In order to increase the probablity of acceptance by the publisher and indexing by publication databases such as DBLP, only a curated list of the most qualitative papers form the official conference proceedings which are submitted for publication as a volume of “CEUR Workshop Proceedings”. The official proceedings inclusion decision is at the discretion of the editors of the proceedings and is based, in part, on the following recommendations:
- articles that do not respect the “CEUR Workshop Proceedings” format are not included;
- articles in French are unlikely to be included;
- articles should describe the state of the art, and position the content of the article in this context;
- articles should contain a number of references and citations in adequation with the volume of publications related to the work described;
- regular papers are more likely to be included than short papers.
Articles accepted for presentation at the conference, but not included in the official conference proceedings (all articles if there are no proceedings published as a volume of “CEUR Workshop Proceedings”), are published on C&ESAR’s websites.
In order to facilitate presentation of work already pusblished elsewhere or intended for publication in another venue, authors can explicitly opt out of inclusion in any form of proceedings.
- Registration of proposals (title and abstract): Wednesday, May 10, 2023
- Submission of the proposals (3 to 16 pages): Wednesday, May 17, 2023
- Notification of preselection to authors: Wednesday, June 28, 2023
- Submission of the final version: Wednesday, August 30, 2023
- 10 to 16 pages for regular papers
- 4 to 8 pages for short papers
- 3 to 6 pages for extended abstracts
- Notification of acceptation to authors: Wednesday, September 20, 2023
- European Cyber Week (ECW): Tuesday, November 21, 2023 to Thursday, November 23, 2023